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FOREWORD
In the aftermath of the ousting of dictatorial regimes in 2011, the fragile political and security situations in Tunisia and Libya have contributed to the
emergence of new threats that menace the stability
of both countries and of their neighbors. Severe terrorist incidents have become frequent throughout the
region. To name but one incident, the borders that Algeria shares with those two countries exposed it to a
major terrorist attack on the Tiguentourine gas facility
in January 2013.
The existence and recognition of common threats
has prompted military-to-military cooperation among
most, but not all, North African countries. Algeria, a
country with a sizable military capability, has started
working closely with its neighbor countries to reduce
terrorist threats. Over the last 3 years, Algeria and
Tunisia in particular have intensified their military
cooperation to tackle terrorist groups in Tunisia and
fight against illicit trafficking across their respective
borders.
Nevertheless, despite the acute need for a region-wide security cooperation framework, concrete
achievements remain limited. There are a wide range
of political and technical challenges that undermine
any effective cooperation among the North African
countries. The absence of a strong military institution
in Libya that is able to control the entire Libyan territory has hindered effective security cooperation with
that country. Strained relations between Algeria and
Morocco are another dominant political issue that is
depriving the region of important regional security
and diplomatic synergies; this despite the fact that
Morocco has a well-equipped and experienced military force and relatively strong political stability.
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In this Letort Paper, British researcher Dr. Mohammed El-Katiri analyzes the North African security
landscape in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, with
particular focus on the security threats that are behind the inception of military-to-military cooperation
among North African countries, and the relevance of
these security dynamics to U.S. security and interests.
The author also discusses key region-wide issues and
challenges that are impeding region-wide security cooperation between all of the North African countries.
This Letort Paper concludes with recommendations
on how the United States could leverage its already
existing military and development assistance to encourage close cooperation between North African
countries, thus fostering the shared goals of security
and stability.
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			Director
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SUMMARY
The fragile political and security situations in Tunisia and Libya that followed Arab Spring upheavals
have contributed to the emergence of new threats that
menace the stability of both countries and their neighbors. Severe terrorist incidents have become frequent
throughout the region. Algeria alone was targeted by
several terrorist attacks that have been linked to Libya
and Tunisia. To name but one incident, the borders
that Algeria shares with the two countries exposed it
to a major terrorist attack on the Tiguentourine gas
facility in January 2013.
Confronted by these common threats, North African authorities have quickly recognized the importance of establishing military-to-military cooperation.
A few security initiatives were launched among most,
but not all, North African countries. Algeria, a country with a sizable military capability and experience
in cross-border security cooperation, has intensified
its efforts to build security cooperation arrangements
with its neighboring countries to reduce cross-border
security menaces, in particular terrorism threats. The
main impetus behind Algeria’s engagement and deployment of significant resources to help Tunisia and
Libya with their internal security challenges has been
a strong desire to maintain the country’s relative stability. Over the last 3 years, for instance, Algeria and
Tunisia in particular have intensified their military
cooperation to tackle terrorist groups in Tunisia and
fight against illicit trafficking across their respective
borders.
Though there has been relative success in establishing bilateral security cooperation agreements focusing mainly on border security issues, attempts to
build an effective regional security structure to face
xi

many of the region’s intertwined security challenges
have failed. The failure to significantly expand cooperation to include all North African countries is
attributed largely to three key factors:
• First, the current fluid political and security
situation in Libya and Tunisia that has made
it difficult for both countries to impose control
over their territories and borders.
• Second, the existence of uneven and diverse
military capabilities among North Africa’s
armed forces that hinders interoperability
and effective military cooperation. The armed
forces of these three countries have significant
differences, qualitatively and quantitatively, in
terms of their military equipment, training, and
doctrines. This is further worsened by the lack
of any history of regional exercises.
• Third, the long-standing dispute and rivalry
between Algeria and Morocco remains a major
obstacle to building any effective regional security cooperation.
This Letort Paper examines the North African security landscape in the aftermath of the Arab Spring,
with particular focus on the security threats that
prompted a couple of bilateral military-to-military cooperation arrangements among North African countries, and the relevance of these security dynamics to
U.S. security and interests. It explains key issues and
challenges impeding region-wide security cooperation encompassing all North African countries, and
concludes with recommendations on how the United
States could leverage its already existing military and
development assistance to encourage close cooperation between North African countries, thus fostering
the shared goals of security and stability.
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THE QUEST FOR MILITARY COOPERATION
IN NORTH AFRICA: PROSPECTS
AND CHALLENGES
INTRODUCTION
The security landscape in North African countries
has changed radically since the eruption of political
turmoil in Tunisia in December 2010, the start of what
is popularly known as the Arab Spring. The toppling
of Egyptian, Tunisian, and Libyan leaders during 2011
did not result in a peaceful and uncomplicated transition for the new political regimes, but rather the opposite. Despite the tremendous differences between
their post-2011 revolution political transitions,1 Egypt,
Tunisia, and Libya have one factor in common: their
security situation has seriously deteriorated. The ongoing years-long violent conflict in Libya has posed
serious challenges not only to Libyan society but also
to its immediate neighboring countries to the west,
Algeria and Tunisia. In addition to direct combat between armed militia forces, violent incidents in the
form of car bombings, assassinations, tribal killings,
and more have become almost a daily occurrence in
many Libyan regions and cities. The collapse of state
institutions in Libya, and the inability of its post-revolution governments to maintain order and control the
country’s borders, has had an immense impact on regional security. Jihadist groups have experienced significant growth since the fall of former Libyan leader
Col. Muammar Qadhafi, and Libya has become an
exporter of violence to its neighboring countries.
Meanwhile, the inability of Tunisian security
forces to confront extremist groups within Tunisia effectively or to control their cross-border activities is
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threatening Algeria. Unsurprisingly, Algeria has been
one of the region’s most vocal states in warning of
the deterioration of regional security as a result of the
sudden fall of regimes in its neighboring countries.
Thus, Algerian officials did not welcome the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) intervention
in Libya, and their recognition of the rebel National
Transitional Council as Libya’s de facto government
was granted only after the death of Qadhafi.
Algerian estimates of the security risks were vindicated by events. The current North African landscape
is characterized by an upsurge in terrorist attacks,
along with cross border trafficking of arms, people,
and drugs.
In this context, a growing demand for regional
security cooperation has arisen. Several initiatives
for regional and bilateral security cooperation have
emerged. Algeria, until now relatively unaffected by
the instability that is sweeping across the region, has
played an important role in tackling these security
threats and providing support to its neighboring countries. Algeria responded not only by increasing its security presence at its borders, but also by engaging in
direct security cooperation with Libya and Tunisia in
attempts to reduce both cross-border threats and challenges to internal stability. However, this new drive to
foster security cooperation within the region remains
governed by short-term necessity rather than a strategic vision to build an effective regional security architecture that capitalizes on the existing capabilities
across the region. The exclusion of Morocco—another
stable and militarily capable country—highlights this
lack of a strategic approach.
This Letort Paper will concentrate mainly on the
post-2011 revolutions security landscape in the fol-
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lowing three North African countries: Algeria, Libya,
and Tunisia. There is a range of reasons for focusing
specifically on these three nations. They share common borders, and they have already launched several
cooperative initiatives to strengthen their border security. By contrast, Egypt also shares long borders with
Libya and has been directly affected in a variety of
ways by the worsening of the security situation in Libya; but Egypt’s cooperation with other North African
countries has remained limited. Similarly, although
Morocco has shown interest in cooperating and assisting to bring stability to the region, the country’s participation was limited by North Africa’s politics and
geography. Morocco has not been directly affected by
the security chaos happening in Libya or the increased
terrorist attacks in Tunisia. Morocco is benefiting from
not sharing any physical border with these two countries, and having Algeria as a security buffer. Political
disputes between Algeria and Morocco have impeded
Moroccan involvement in post-2011 security cooperation forums. Attempts to orchestrate a pan-North African response to the Libyan crisis have failed due to
a divergence of political views. For instance, Algeria
supported the Egyptian view that military intervention was required to stabilize Libya.
The first section of the Letort Paper will examine
the North African security landscape in the aftermath
of the Arab Spring, with particular focus on the security threats that lie behind the inception of military-tomilitary cooperation among North African countries.
The second section will discuss the scope of current
military cooperation arrangements in the region. The
third section looks at the challenges that are still inhibiting the region from effectively constituting a
regional security cooperation framework.
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NORTH AFRICAN SECURITY: A DIRE STATE
OF AFFAIRS
Libya.
Libya has been embroiled in armed conflict since
early 2011, when several Libyan regions and tribes
took up arms against their former leader, Col. Muammar Qadhafi. Successive interim governments have
faced great difficulties in imposing control over the
country’s vast territory and long borders. Libya has
approximately 4,000 km (2,485 miles) of land border
shared with six countries, and 1,700 km (1,056 miles)
of coastline.
After 2013, the security situation deteriorated
drastically. Libya today is characterized by insecurity, violence, and deep political crisis. With the fall
of Qadhafi, the state’s administration and security apparatus collapsed partially or entirely.2 This vacuum
was quickly filled by a variety of revolutionary armed
groups, who took the responsibility of maintaining
law and order throughout the country without a unified command structure to oversee their work.3 Any
observer of the current Libyan political and security
situations will be confused by a mosaic of militias and
events, and trying to comprehend “who is who” is far
from being an easy task. Ideology, money, identity,
and immunity remain as the key factors that drive
the behavior of armed groups and political parties in
today’s Libya.
Rivalry among these armed groups began almost
immediately, and by now has deeply divided the
country and society into different camps. At the time
of this writing, fighting continues in Libya between
the two main armed camps—Misrata-based armed
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groups calling their Operation LIBYA DAWN (Fajr
Libya), and Zintan-based militias and elements of the
army commanded by General Khalifa Haftar conducting Operation DIGNITY (al-Karama). General Haftar’s
Operation DIGNITY was launched in May 2014 with
a mandate to expel Islamist armed groups first from
Benghazi, and then from other Libyan cities.4 Over 2
years later, neither side has managed to make any significant expansion of territory under their control.5
The polarization of Libya is extending to other
spheres. Libya remains divided between two governments and two parliaments that are jockeying for
power and political legitimacy. Efforts by United Nations (UN) special representatives to establish a “unity
government” have so far made little progress toward
ending the political stalemate. The final political
framework to form the Government of National Accord proposed by the UN Special Representative Bernardino Leon in October 2015 was not endorsed by all
Libyan stakeholders.6 At the time of this writing, the
UN diplomats continue to broker a new version of the
October 2015 power-sharing agreement in the hope
that it will be acceptable to all parties.
There is almost a consensus among all the political parties and regions of Libya that successive governments since the fall of Qadhafi’s regime have been
weak and unable to handle the complexities of political transition and building state institutions. These
governments have lacked a vision to rebuild the country, and did not have the capacity to deal with the
many issues that Libya is currently facing. Members
of these various governments are seen as indecisive
and lacking firmness in situations when that virtue is
very much needed.7

5

Lack of an effective centralized state security apparatus has meant that successive governments since
2012 have not been able to establish effective oversight,
management, and control of the country’s weapons
arsenals. Considerable quantities of military materiel
and weapons including small arms, heavy weapons,
and ammunition, as well as mines, explosives, and
missiles, are in the hands of militias, radical groups,
and individuals.8 Several Libyan armed groups have
illegally seized energy facilities from the proper authorities as a way to access funds and pressure the
elected government and state institutions for political
concessions.9
The security apparatus, particularly the military,
is highly politicized. The armed forces have divided
their loyalties between the two fighting sides in Tripoli and Benghazi. The army has been captured by entrenched political and armed factions that emerged
during the 2011 war and after the killing of Qadhafi.
Several of its top officers have taken a side with one or
another of the key political forces in the country. This
politicization has further undermined any prospect of
re-building the state institutions. Efforts by numerous
countries and international organizations to provide
support and capacity building for Libyan security institutions have been in vain.10
Another feature of post-Qadhafi Libya is the
emergence of various violent extremist groups, such
as Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi and in Darnah, as
well as elements of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM).11 The so-called Islamic State has extended its
presence and influence in several Libyan cities, and
has been responsible for brutal group killings across
Libya.12 These radical groups have taken advantage of
the absence of a strong government with an effective
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security apparatus, the availability of weapons, and
porous borders to grow and spread their influence
across the country.
On the political front today, Libya is divided and
paralyzed by rivalry between its various political
groups and tribes. The country has two rival governments and parliaments, each backed by one of the two
fighting camps and by a set of international actors.
The interim government, which was appointed by the
elected House of Representatives, has been pushed
away from Tripoli to the eastern city of Tobruk by the
Libya Dawn coalition of militias since August 2014.
The second one is a self-declared government, known
as the National Salvation Government, based in the
Libyan capital and backed by some members of the
former parliament and the Libya Dawn coalition. Both
governments claim legitimacy, and both seem committed to keeping Libya a unified country.
Tunisia.
In Tunisia, the picture is less chaotic than Libya
but far from ideal. The emergence of radical groups
remains the main feature characterizing the post-Ben
Ali political transition and security landscape. The
mushrooming of terrorist groups in Tunisia has surprised Tunisians and international observers alike.
Until 2011, Tunisia, with a comparatively well-educated populace with rising economic expectations, has
had a limited history of violent extremism compared
to neighboring Algeria or Libya. This was largely a
consequence of the tight security policy implemented by security forces during Ben Ali’s rule. Another
factor has been the secular character that dominated
most urban populations across most Tunisian terri-
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tory. The number of terrorist attacks since the 1980s,
an era that saw the emergence of Islamist movements
across North Africa, was very limited before 2012.13
The appearance and rise of the Ansar al-Shari’a and
Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade came as result of a prolonged
political instability within Tunisia and the porous borders with Libya. These two groups have been behind
a series of terrorist attacks targeting civilians, political
figures, and government forces, which have increased
markedly over the past 3 years.
Tunisia continues to suffer from sporadic terrorist
attacks, despite the banning of Ansar al-Shari’a and its
designation as a terrorist organization in August 2013,
and the launch of a major counter-terrorism operation
under the leadership of former Prime Minister Mehdi
Jomaa in early 2014. At the time of this writing, the
most recent deadly attack in urban areas had taken
place in Sousse, a popular Tunisian holiday town. In
June 2015, an armed terrorist killed about 40 people
on the beach of one of Sousse’s luxury hotels.14 This
was the second major terrorist attack in the country
in less than half a year. On March 18, 2015, a group
of terrorists fired on foreign tourists on a visit to the
Bardo Museum in Tunis, the capital city of Tunisia,
killing about 22 people.
These terrorist incidents have constituted a serious
threat to the country’s political transition and have had
a devastating impact on the Tunisian economy. On the
political front, these terrorist attacks have added more
strain to an already problematic and polarized political divide between moderate Islamists and other secular political parties. The victory of the Islamist party,
Ennahda, in the National Constituent Assembly elections in October 2011 was never accepted by some
Tunisian secularist parties.15 Since then, the two political camps have been in open confrontation with each
8

other. For instance, on February 8, 2013—2 days after
the assassination of Chokri Belaid, a leftist politician
from the opposition—Tunisia experienced another cycle of political instability, when liberal-secular activists
took to the streets to protest against the Islamist-led
government. Protestors were blaming Ennahda for
the growing extremism and associated violence in the
country.16 In economic terms, the vital tourism sector
was severely affected by the various terrorist attacks,
depriving the economy of important foreign currency
proceeds and employment opportunities. The tourism
sector employs about half a million people and contributes 7.4 % of the country's gross domestic product
(GDP).17
The concentration of terrorists in Mount Chaambi,
the mountainous area of the Kasserine governorate
near the border with Algeria, is still posing a challenge
both to Tunisian and Algerian stability. This region of
Tunisia has seen a series of violent confrontations between Tunisian armed forces and extremist militants
since 2012.18
The Tunisian security forces, including its armed
forces, were overwhelmed by the sudden change in
the security threat landscape internally and at the
country’s borders. The current Tunisian president,
Béji Caïd Essebsi, explained the situation of his country during a visit to Algiers in February 2015, saying
that: “Tunisians have no previous experience with terrorism. We never had any terrorism. It’s a new thing
for us. And I think that Tunisians cannot effectively
solve the problem by themselves.”19
The Tunisian armed forces are undermanned,
under-equipped, and lacking in training to engage in
anti-terrorism operations. These problems were not
a result of the 2011 revolution. They were the consequence of years of under-investment in developing
9

and expanding Tunisia’s military capabilities. The
limited achievements of the Tunisian armed forces’
various campaigns against Ansar al-Sharia and AQIM
have given rise to criticism from the government,
and led to the resignation of Chief of Staff General
Rachid Ammar in June 2013.20 With its difficult economic situation since 2011, the Tunisian government
has not been able to make the necessary investment in
the country’s armed forces in order to fight militant
groups effectively. Consequently, the country is now
more dependent on external assistance in the form
of training, equipment, and intelligence. The United
States and Algeria have become the main providers of
military assistance to Tunisia since the ousting of Ben
Ali in January 2011. For instance, the U.S. government
has been increasing its military assistance and training to help the Tunisian state overcome its security
challenges.21
Algeria.
Although Algeria did not experience protests and
instability on similar scales to those seen in Tunisia and
Libya, the country has been affected by the increasing
instability within those neighboring countries. Over
the last 4 years, several terrorist attacks targeting Algeria have been linked to Libya and Tunisia. Terrorists
had either been trained in Libya, or received weapons and logistical support from Tunisian and Libyan
extremist groups. From the early days of the Arab
Spring protests, Algerian security and governmental
officials were alarmed by the potential consequences
of instability on their immediate eastern borders. They
were concerned because instability in Libya and Tunisia would open an entirely new front for the Algerian
security establishment.
10

The Algerian government and military responded
quickly and took precautionary measures to protect
the country’s borders with Libya for fear of possible
terrorist incidents. The Algerian army launched a
large-scale surveillance and security operation along
the joint border during the early months of 2011, before the fall of Qadhafi’s regime. The Algerian Ministry of Interior also mobilized tribal leaders in the
south of Algeria to provide support to surveillance
operations by a variety of national security forces.22
Algerian military and political elites were particularly concerned about AQIM exploiting the security
vacuum in Libya and across the borders to carry out
attacks within Algeria.
The worsening of the security situation since 2011
in the Maghreb has added more pressure on the Algerian regime. Algeria was already committing significant amounts of security materiel and personnel
resources to monitoring and protecting its borders
in the south with Mali and Mauritania, as well as the
Western border with Morocco. To hinder potential attacks by armed terrorist groups and the infiltration of
arms, Algeria has deployed about 50,000 troops along
its border with Libya.23
These early fears proved to be correct. Since 2012,
the Algerian security authorities have repeatedly announced seizures of weapons smuggled from Libya.24
In January 2013, Algeria suffered a terrorist attack on
the In Amenas gas facility in the Tinguentourine region, about 1,300 km (800 miles) southeast of the Algerian capital Algiers, but only about 60 km (40 miles)
west of the Libyan border. Algerian officials have
stated that vehicles and arms used in the attack on In
Amenas came from Libya. This terrorist attack, that
took the lives of about 38 local and international workers, deeply shocked the Algerian political and military
11

elites. It constituted a major blow to the reputation of
the Algerian security establishment’s experience and
expertise in fighting against terrorism.
Furthermore, Algeria’s internal security has not
been perfect. Extremist groups, including AQIM, have
sporadically attacked governmental institutions, security personnel, and foreigners. The country has also
experienced popular uprisings and inter-community
conflicts in a variety of regions. For instance, Algeria
has witnessed sporadic clashes in the southern city of
Ghardaia and its environs, known as the M’zab Valley, between Algerian Sunni and Ibadi Muslims over
the last 2 years.25 The number of protests by young
men demanding jobs, housing, and other socio-economic benefits in various southern Algerian towns
has increased since 2011. The inhabitants of these peripheral regions feel that, although their land is rich in
resources, most well paid jobs go to residents from the
Northern provinces or to foreigners, including sometimes positions that require no sophisticated skills.
These internal challenges to the country and to
government stability demand significant political attention and security resources. Since 2011, the Algerian government has become more attentive to the
demands of the local elites and of ordinary people in
these poor and marginalized provinces. Several Algerian ministers have traveled frequently to hold meetings with notables of Algeria’s southern cities and the
provinces of Tamnarasset, Ghardaia, and Illzi. There
is one common demand raised by representatives of
the region in all these meetings, which is that more
attention must be paid to the region’s socio-economic
needs.
The hydrocarbon bonanza of the last decade, and
the high public spending to revitalize and diversify
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the economy that accompanied it, was not without its
shortcomings. Increased public spending carried with
it several unintended socio-political consequences.
The recent flow of public money to build infrastructures or to support the private sector has further contributed not only to rising incomes but also to wealth
inequality among Algerians, and has mainly benefited
those who are in power and their entourage. This illmanaged distribution of public resources across the
country’s regions and social groups has led to widespread social malaise.
While not wishing to become directly involved,
Algeria had no interest in seeing radical changes in its
neighboring countries or in supporting such change.
This has been evidenced by Algeria’s cautious diplomatic stances during 2011. Algeria disagreed with
the majority of Arab countries on the suspension of
Libyan membership in the Arab League in February
2011; neither did it support NATO intervention to
topple the Qadhafi regime. During a meeting of the
Arab League on March 12, 2011, Algeria was one of
the few Arab countries that opposed a resolution that
called on the UN Security Council to establish a no-fly
zone over Libya. During the Arab League debates, Algeria argued that allowing such a foreign intervention
would destabilize the country and the entire region.26
Algeria’s political and military elites have never been
comfortable with the idea of a presence on the ground
of a Western or any other foreign military in its immediate borders. Finally, Algeria was the last Arab
neighboring country to recognize Libya’s National
Transitional Council (NTC) as legitimate representatives of the Libyan people. Algeria’s tacit recognition took place during a meeting with representatives
of the NTC only a few weeks before the killing of
Qadhafi in October 2011.
13

CURRENT STATE OF SECURITY COOPERATION
It quickly became evident for North African leaders that the cross-border security threats facing their
countries were interlinked and could not be solved at
a national level, but instead required a regional approach. It also became clear that the lack of a regional
security architecture constituted a weakness in effective tackling of cross-border threats, and restoring
peace and stability in the region.
These factors contribute to the leading role that
Algeria has played to support regional stability since
2011. Algeria has seen cooperation with its neighboring countries as a rational step to maintaining its own
stability and prosperity. Sharing both a long border
and strong social and cultural ties with Libya and Tunisia, Algeria was alarmed by the deterioration of the
security situation in the region, particularly in Libya,
and the implications for national security of arms and
people smuggling across its borders.
Algeria’s relative political stability, counter-terrorism experience, military capabilities, and geographic
location have a made it a partner of choice for the Tunisian and Libyan security and political authorities. As
political upheaval has raged in many parts of the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria, just like Morocco,
has shown a remarkable degree of resilience against
a regional contagion. The country has managed to
maintain a degree of political stability despite recurring protests and widespread social malaise. Protests
of one sort or another continue to be regular events
across Algerian cities and regions, but they have not
constituted a threat to the stability of the government
or country.
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Algeria possesses substantial armed forces, and is
the biggest military spender in the entire African continent. In 2013, Algeria was the first African country
to spend more than $10 billion U.S. dollars on its military.27 Benefiting from high oil export revenues since
2004, Algeria has dedicated an important percentage
of its GDP to modernizing its armed forces to confront
a variety of threat scenarios, and achieve its ambition
for regional hegemonic power.
Algeria has built up considerable experience and
expertise in fighting terrorist groups over the last 25
years. The confrontation between the Algerian security apparatus and different extremist groups dates
back to 1992, when the Algerian military establishment suspended a second round of elections to prevent a victorious Islamist party (the Islamic Salvation
Front, known by its French acronym FIS) from leading
the government. The cancelation of election results
had sparked a confrontation between armed Islamist
organizations, particularly the Armed Islamic Group
(GIA) and Islamic Salvation Army, and Algerian state
forces, which lasted for more than a decade.28 This extended conflict witnessed the use of a variety of terrorist attacks on military and civilian targets, and resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of Algerians. The
end of the civil war in the early 2000s did not mean
the end of terrorism. Algeria has faced, since then, a
variety of successive terrorist groups, including the
GIA, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat,
and AQIM.29 Today, AQIM continues to pose a daily
threat to the lives of Algerian security and government personnel and foreign workers.
Algeria has also accumulated practical experience
in cross-border collaboration to tackle similar security
threats, with a difference in scale, to the one that it
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is currently facing on its eastern borders with Libya
and Tunisia. In 2010, Algeria established and hosted a
joint command headquarters, known as the Joint Operation Staff Committee, in the southern Algerian city
of Tamanrasset to facilitate liaison with its immediate
southern neighbors, namely Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.30 The main purpose behind the setting up of this
military structure was to coordinate military operations to combat violent extremist organizations and
illegal trafficking in the Sahara. This regional security initiative, with all the challenges that it has faced
since its inception, has been a steep learning curve for
Algeria on how to handle cross-border security cooperation and coordination as well as how to develop
effective mechanisms to combat terror and crime in all
their forms.
Early attempts at security cooperation in this North
African sub-region have been exclusively bilateral,
which came as a natural response to the deterioration
of the border security of all countries involved. Efforts
to establish a tripartite (Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia)
security architecture did not yield any results. The
first meeting between the prime ministers of Algeria,
Libya, and Tunisia was held in January 2013, in the
Libyan oasis of Ghadames, to discuss measures to secure the common borders.31 However, there was no
serious follow-up after this meeting. These countries
have failed to operationalize their initial agreement to
create joint committees to coordinate and oversee joint
patrol missions. The main obstacle that hindered the
development of this regional security structure has
been the complex political and security situation in
Libya.
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The level of Algerian-Tunisian security cooperation
evolved with time. From late 2012, cooperation started
with an ad hoc exchange of information between the
security forces of both countries, and evolved with an
expansion of security cooperation areas. The previous
Tunisian Minister of National Defense Ghazi Jeribi
described his country’s cooperation with Algeria:
Tunisian-Algerian military cooperation is being
looked at with great interest from both sides. We
have worked to support and develop this and move
towards true partnership in the fields of training and
exchanging experience, including responding to the
requirements of the two national armies and enhancing their operational capabilities.32

In May 2014, Tunisia and Algeria formalized their
security cooperation by signing a border security cooperation agreement to combat cross-border terrorism
and organized crime. The agreement aims to facilitate
the coordination of joint operations to ensure border
security, sharing of information and intelligence, and
exchange of experience and expertise through training and joint exercises. After this agreement was
signed, meetings between Algerian and Tunisian
senior officials and officers have been frequent to coordinate their efforts and exchange information and
perspectives.
Tunisia’s push for this security partnership was
not only driven by geographic factors. Algeria’s security forces are among the best-equipped and trained
to fight extremist groups across the Middle East and
in Africa, and the Algerian security apparatus has
accumulated more than 2 decades of experience in
fighting terrorism internally. From Algeria’s perspective, cooperating with Tunisian security forces will
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enhance Algeria’s ability to collect intelligence and to
effectively pursue terrorists within Tunisian territory.
Since the fall of Qadhafi in late 2011, Algerian and
Libyan officers and officials have met on many occasions to discuss measures to ensure the security of their
1,000 km (621 mile) bilateral land border. The Libyan
National Transitional Council (NTC) approached Algeria in the early months of 2012 asking for support
to protect the shared border while Libya was building its own professional border guard. Early discussions of bilateral cooperation between Algerian and
post-Qadhafi Libyan authorities started on the margin of a regional security conference, the Ministerial
Regional Border Security Conference, held in Libya
in March 2012. Algeria and Libya took advantage of
this ministerial meeting to sign a bilateral agreement
to strengthen border security cooperation. The agreement, in principal, focused on the training of Libyan
police and security personnel by Algeria, the conduct
of joint operations to maintain border security, and
exchange of information between their border control
authorities. During the same meeting, both parties deliberated on the creation of a bilateral committee on
borders that would expand and diversify areas of cooperation, including security and the socio-economic
development of border regions.33 However, no concrete measures were adopted as a follow up to this
agreement.
More than a year later, and with a new government in Libya led by Ali Zeidan, Algeria offered to
train Libyan police and military forces during a visit
by the Algerian Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal
to Tripoli in December 2013. With the exception of
a few visits by Libyan delegations, no actual training was provided. Current cooperation between the

18

two countries has therefore been limited to occasional
intelligence sharing. This scant progress is a direct
consequence of the deteriorating political and security situation in Libya, which has made endeavors for
security cooperation unrealistic. It is also a reflection
of the lack of confidence on the Libyan side about the
stance and intentions of the Algerian regime vis-a-vis
the National Transitional Council and post-Qadhafi
political leadership, following Algeria’s ambiguous
attitude toward the Libyan civil war during 2011.
In addition, the Algerian authorities have provided
refuge for several members of the Qadhafi family.34
Meanwhile, Algeria has quietly attempted to collaborate on an ad hoc basis with a number of dominant
militias that hold power on the ground in Libya, but
these attempts have never been officially announced.
CHALLENGES FOR SECURITY REGIONAL
COOPERATION
Though all North African countries—and perhaps
a variety of their international partners—have recognized the need for an effective regional security architecture to face the variety of intertwined regional security challenges, the outcome has been disappointing.
At least three main factors have curbed enthusiasm
and hindered the attempts made by North African
countries to establish an effective regional security cooperation framework, namely: the fluid political and
security situation in Libya and Tunisia; the existence
of uneven and diverse military capabilities that complicate interoperability and cooperation; and finally,
a fraught relationship between Algeria and Morocco.
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Fluid and Uncertain Political and Security
Situation.
Despite the desire to create a tripartite security
architecture—by Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia—to respond to rising security threats, several political and
security factors have limited the achievement of this
goal. A combination of continuous political instability
and security chaos in Libya has impeded any effective
cooperation among the three countries. The continuing churn of political leadership, either at ministerial
level or of senior officers in security organizations
in Libya, has made it impossible to materialize any
of the tripartite agreements. This constant change of
personnel has hindered any trust-building initiatives
among security officers and institutions from the three
countries.
Furthermore, the politicization of the military in
Libya since the death of Qadhafi is another factor that
has complicated the picture for Algerian and Tunisian
officers and officials.35 Algeria and Tunisia want to
maintain a neutral position towards internal political
competition in Libya. Neither has any interest in being
perceived as favoring one political group or ideology
over the other. In addition, the situation has not been
made easier by the ambiguous position and powers of
armed militias within the Libyan security apparatus.
These same reasons have impeded any effective collaboration on a bilateral basis between Libya on the
one hand, and Algeria and Tunisia on the other.
Uneven and Diverse Military Capabilities.
A lack of effective cross-border cooperation among
the three North African countries has also been caused
by a mismatch of technological and other military
20

capabilities. The armed forces of these three countries
have significant differences, qualitatively and quantitatively, in terms of their military equipment, training, and doctrines. They also have almost no history of
cooperating or exercising together. The few occasions
where military officers of the three countries have exercised together have been within the framework of
the 5+5 Western Mediterranean Defence initiative, a
multilateral initiative that groups 10 Northern African
and Southern European countries. Though military
exercises are considered an essential part of this regional defense and security cooperation initiative’s
work, most of these exercises have been restricted in
scope and duration and have focused mainly on naval
and air operations.36 Their purpose has been primarily strengthening mutual trust and understanding between the participating multinational forces, and they
were not designed with the intention of achieving an
interoperable joint capability. There have been no specific military exercises dedicated to border patrolling,
intelligence sharing, or combating terrorists in difficult terrain.
Lessons learned by the Algerian military from
other security cooperation experiences with southern
neighbors have not resolved the interoperability challenges faced with Libya and to a lesser extent with
Tunisia. Overcoming such challenges requires coordination of resources and conducting of joint training
exercises. In addition, the most severe challenge has
been a lack of interoperable communication systems
that are essential for any cross-border military operations. Libyan and Tunisian security forces have been
unable to secure their territories; they lack the equipment, trained personnel, and financial resources to
conduct surveillance and reconnaissance operations,
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and even to share information with their Algerian
partners in a timely manner.
Stiff Relations Between Algeria and Morocco.
Relations between Algeria and Morocco have historically been tense. The two countries fought each
other in 1963 over border issues and during the 1970s
over the Western Sahara. Their bilateral relations have
particularly deteriorated since 1994 when both countries closed their borders following a terrorist attack
in the Moroccan tourist city of Marrakesh. Morocco
imposed visa restrictions on Algerian citizens after
the involvement of a few French citizens with Algerian backgrounds in this terrorist incident; Algeria responded by imposing visa restrictions on Moroccans
and closing its land borders with Morocco.
Recent attempts to put Algerian and Moroccan
hegemonic ambitions aside and combine their efforts
for the stability of the region have not been successful. In 2012, there were high hopes among some North
African leaders and international observers that the
rapid changes occurring in the North Africa and Sahel
strategic environments would provide a new impetus
to revive an existing cooperative framework, the Arab
Maghreb Union (known with its French acronyms
as UMA). This was evident from numerous political
statements issued by the Tunisian president Moncef
Marzouki. He set the reviving of the UMA as an important goal in his foreign policy agenda. During his
first tour to North African countries in February 2012,
he declared that: “We will work to restore unity with
our brothers in Algeria, Morocco, Libya and Mauritania,” hoping that the leaders of the region would
work together to overcome hindrances that had halted
regional cooperation for more than 2 decades.37
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These early initiatives by the Tunisian president
seemed to have motivated other leaders. However,
against the hope of many political leaders in North
Africa, competition between Algeria and Morocco for
a regional hegemonic role intensified and extended to
the Sahel region. The Moroccan and Algerian regimes
have engaged in a race since 2012 to play a leading role
in mediating the Mali crisis. They have also competed
to host and support dialogue among Libyan political
factions.
The rivalry between Algeria and Morocco for regional leadership is another stumbling block to building an effective regional security cooperation mechanism. Algeria and Morocco are the main two military
powers in North Africa in terms of the size of their
armed forces, their capabilities, and experience. Moroccan authorities have shown interest in contributing
to any efforts to stabilize the region. Despite the fact
that Morocco does not share borders with Tunisia or
Libya, the Moroccan leadership is also concerned by
the increased radicalization and the uncontrolled flow
of weapons in the region.
Nevertheless, another source of concern to Morocco is the potential instability of Algeria. A sudden fall
of the current Algerian political regime could have farreaching consequences for Moroccan security. The fall
of the Qadhafi regime in Libya, and its consequences
for both neighbors and rivals in the Maghreb and Sahel regions, provides a sobering case study. Despite
the rivalry between the two countries, Morocco thus
has a vested interest in continuing Algerian stability.38
Algeria’s efforts to exclude Morocco from regional
security cooperation arrangements have been counterproductive, depriving Libya and Tunisia of the capabilities offered by the Moroccan security apparatus.
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Morocco’s political stability and security capabilities
could be a substantial reinforcement to efforts made
by Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia to tackle these crossborder challenges. One result is that security cooperation remains primarily focused on protecting borders
instead of addressing capability and capacity development of countries in need—and in the case of Libya,
even the borders are incompletely covered.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The absence of a regional security architecture in
North Africa is a handicap to restoring stability in Tunisia and Libya, and containing any further threats to
the security of the region. The existing bilateral military-to-military cooperation that has characterized the
North African geopolitical scene since the erupting
of 2011 popular upheavals remains a positive shift.
However, there is currently limited prospect that
these bilateral security arrangements will lead to any
substantial result in eradicating cross border threats,
or evolve to become a region-wide mechanism.
The rivalry between Algeria and Morocco over regional influence remains the main challenge to broadening security cooperation to include all North African
countries. Decades of rivalry have contributed to animosity and mistrust between the two countries. The
continuing Libyan security and political chaos that
further exacerbates the fragile stability of its neighboring countries is certainly another important factor
that has impeded effective regional cooperation. Algeria has apparently seen in this security crisis on its
eastern borders an opportunity to play a hegemonic
role and gain influence in the region. Against the early
hopes and expectations of some North African politi-
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cal leaders, both Algeria and Morocco will continue
to evaluate the geopolitical changes in the region for
opportunities to strengthen and reinforce their respective positions of power.
If there is one lesson to be learned from the last
4 years of attempts at cross-border cooperation in
North Africa, it is that establishing effective security
cooperation is impossible without a range of specific
factors and conditions. It requires financial resources,
equipment, and appropriate political conditions within each country, as well as the obvious—a healthy degree of trust among these countries. In the absence of
these conditions, North Africa is likely to be in need of
continuous support from international partners to establish a regional security mechanism that allows it to
meet its security challenges and ensure stability. This
is a role that could be played by the U.S. Department
of Defense, building on and exploiting its already existing engagements with the majority of North African
countries on a bilateral basis.
In particular, the Department of Defense could
leverage its existing and planned military assistance
programs to encourage and facilitate closer defense
and security cooperation among North African countries. Key areas that need immediate attention to increase the effectiveness of existing joint operations
among North African countries are:
• Improving interoperability at a technical level
between North African militaries;
• Providing specific training in tactics, techniques, and procedures suitable for joint operations; and,
• Organizing and supporting region-wide military exercises with a special focus on the kind
of cross-border threats that these countries are
exposed to.
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For instance, the U.S. government has announced
an increase in its military assistance to Tunisia as a
way to both assist the country’s political transition
and combat terrorism. If part of this assistance were
spent on enhancing the interoperability of the Tunisian armed forces and security bodies with those of
its close North African neighbors, the effect of this
U.S. military investment would be multiplied and the
outcomes more sustainable. U.S. investment in such
a capability will help ensure that Tunisia is able to effectively exploit the synergies of joining military capabilities with its neighbors to contain and/or eradicate
current cross-border threats.
Recognizing that competition between two regional powers remains a primary obstacle to greater
cooperation, the U.S. Department of State with support from other government departments involved in
the region should encourage Algeria and Morocco to
engage in direct political talks to overcome their political differences. Reconciling these two U.S. partners,
or at the least assisting them in finding joint interests,
would greatly improve the chances of establishing a
regional security organization in North Africa that has
the requisite means, material, support and experience
to combat terrorism and other forms of cross-border
crimes. The defense and security capabilities of both
countries, if properly applied, could also be of great
significance to any international effort to stabilize
Libya and rebuild its security institutions.
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